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Aggregate poverty would fall fairly rapidiy if moderate growth
in average consumption levels could be sustained and the poor
could share at least proportionally in that growth. But it would
take only small adverse shifts in the world distribution of income
to wipe out the potential gains to the poor from economic growth.
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The authors estimate that about one in five  However, the authors' results also suggest
persons in the developing world did not attain a  that even a seemingly modest worsening in
consumption level of $23 per month in 1985  distribution could upset this progress in poverty
adjusted to constant $US purchasing power.  alleviation. For example, if the same I percent
About one in three persons did not attain a  growth rate in average consumption was associ-
consumption level of $31 per month.  They  ated with only a 0.25 percent annual incrcase in
argue that a strong case can be made for treating  the world Gini index of inequality, the reduction
the $23 figure as a reasonable lower bound for  in the poverty gap attainable through growth
an absolute poverty line, while $31 is of interest  would be virtually eliminated.  Such a rate of
as a common poverty line in low-income coun-  increase in the world Gini index has been
tries.  observed over reent  decades, associated with
the relatively low growth rates of a number of
They find that the average consumption of  the poorest countries.  In this case, the number of
the poor in the developing world was about 30  persons who do not attain even the most meager
percent below either poverty line. This may be a  consumption levels would almost certainly
very significant gap for a poor person.  But,  increase.
despite the large numbers of poor, the aggregate
gap turns out to be a very small proportion of  On the other hand, a pattem of growth more
world consumption; for example, the aggregate  favorable to the poor could rapidly accelerate
poverty gap of the developing countries at the  global poverty reduction. The authors consider a
$31 poverty line is about 1.5 percent of the  rate of decrease in the world Gini index of 0.25
aggregate consumption of the non-socialist  percent per year, roughly equivalent to a transfer
countries, falling to a mere 0.5 percent for the  of one-third of 1 percent of the world's mean
lower poverty line.  income from the better-off half to the poorer half
of the world's population.  This would roughly
The authors find that aggregate poverty in  double the rate of decrease in the aggregate
the developing world will respond fairly elasti-  poverty gap (measured against their higher
cally to economic growth, provided that the poor  poverty line) associated with a I percent annual
share at least proportionately in that growth.  For  growth rate in mean consumption of the develop-
example, a I pereent annual growth rate at all  ing countries.  Instead of the decrease of 2.2
income levels will reduce the proportion of the  percent per year we could expect with
population that is poor by about 2 percent per  distributionally neutral growth, we would see the
year.  If annual population growth rates stay at  poverty gap fall at an impressive annual rate of
about 2 percent or lower, the total number of  4.5 perecnt.
poor will decline.
The PRE Working Paper Scries disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
Affairs Comple-t. An objective of the scrics is to get these findings out quickly, even if pescntations  are less than fully polished.
The findings. ir terpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by PRE Editorial ServicesQuantifying  the Magnitude  and  Severity  of Absolute  Poverty
in the Developing  World  in the  Mid-1980s*
by
Martin  Ravallion,  Gaurav  Datt,
Dominique  van de Walle,  and  Elaine  Chan
Table  of  Contents
1.  Introduction  1
2.  Approaches  to Defining  an "Absolute  Poverty  Line"  2
3.  An  International  Comparison  of Poverty  Lines  4
4.  Poverty  Measures  and  their  Estimation  from  8
Distributional  Data
5.  Extrapolations  When  Distributional  Data  are Unavailable  15
6.  Ine  Estimates  of Aggregate  Poverty  in the  Developing  17
(ountries
7.  An Alternative  Estimate  Based  on the  Berry  et  al.,  20
World  Lorenz  Curve
8.  Scme  Implicaticns  21
9.  Conc!usions  26
Tables  31
Appendices  34
N  tes  37
References  39
Figures  41
*  This  was  prepared  as  a  Background  Paper  for  the  World  Bank's  World
Development  Report  1990.1.  Introduct n
In  counting  the  poor,  and  measuring  the  severity  of absolute  poverty,  one
faces  a number  of difficult  questions. What poverty  line  should  be used?
Should  one  use the  same  poverty  line  across  all  countries? How should  one
adjust  for  differences  across  countries  in  the  purchasing  power  of their
currencies  at official  exchange  rates? How  should  one interpolate  from  the
available  grouped  data  on the  distribution  of income? How  should  one
extrapolate  to countries  for  which  distributional  data  are  unavailable,  or are
highly  imperfect?  And, after  answering  these  questions: What can  we really
learn  from  the  static  picture  of  poverty  about  the  prospects  for  future
poverty  reduction?
This  paper  proposes  a  methodology  for  addressing  these  questions,  and
gives  aggregate  results  for  86  developing  countries  in  the  mid-1980s.  Our
aim is  to  make a necessarily  rough  but  methodologically  consistent  assessment
of the  magnitude  and  severity  of  absolute  poverty,  based  on recent  available
data.
The following  section  suggests  three  possible  interpretations  of an
"absolute  poverty  line"  which  might  be considered  appropriate  for  our  purpose.
This is followed  in  section  3  by an  empirical  examination  of poverty  lines  for
a number  of countries,  both developing  and  developed. This is  used to
identify  two  poverty  lines  for  the  subsequent  analysis. Section  4 discusses
issues  which  arise  in  measuring  poverty  from  readily  available  data  on income
distributions,  while  section  5  outlines  our  approach  to  measuring  poverty  in
countries  for  which  such  data  are  not  available. Section  6 presents  and
discusses  our  estimates  of the  prevalence  and  severity  of absolute  poverty  in
the  developing  countries  in  the  mid-1980s. An alternative,  largely2
independent, estimate is presented in Section 7, based on a previous estimate
of the world Lorenz curve.  Section 8 discusses some of the implications of
these results, particularly their bearing on the prospects for  future poverty
alleviation.  The final section offers some conclusions.
2.  ARRroaches to Defining an "Absolute Poverty Line"
Different societies have different perceptions of what constitutes
"poverty", reflecting (in part) different overall levels of living.  Our aim
here is only to quantify the extent of absolute Roverty in the developing
world, interpreted as the inability to attain consumption levels which would
be deemed adequate in only the poorest countries.  This will leave out many
persons who are clearly deprived relative to others around them.
There are a number of possible interpretations of an "absolute poverty
line" for cross-country comparisons.  Three possibilities can be suggested:
i) One can pick the cost of a bundle of goods which is reasonably well
recognized as constituting an absolute minimum by international standards.
The poverty line of India has been widely used for this purpose, and that
alone makes its continued use compelling.  But why India's poverty line, and
not that of some other country?  We should at least know how sensitive poverty
counts may be to that choice.  One might also argue that the poverty line for
any country should reflect standards of that country.  Two less arbitrary
approaches can be suggested.
ii) In principle, one can think of the real povercy line as comprising an
"absolute" component which is constant across all countries, and a "relative"
component, which is specific to each country.  In seeking to measure the
extent of absolute poverty one might simply ask: What is the lowest real3
poverty  line  observed  in  any  country? This  would  seem  to  be a good  indicator
of the  minimum  acceptable  poverty  line  in assessing  absolute  poverty.
However,  the  answer  may  be quite  sensitive  to the  particular  countries
surveyed  and the  inevitable  measurement  errors  in assessing  local  poverty
lines,  and  in comparing  them  across  countries. It  will  also  he influenced  by
inter-country  differences  in  non-income  factors;  a country  with good  public
services  bene-iting  the  poor,  or a relatively  low-cost  climate.  will  naturally
have  a lower  income  poverty  line.  In the  light  of these  conside.sations,  a
better  approach  is  to try  to assess  a "typical"  poverty  line  amongst  the
poorest  countries. To implement  this  approach  empirically,  we -:an  assume  that
the  relative  component  for  any  country  is largely  determined  by its  mean
income,  though  we allow  the  possibility  of other  factors  (such  as access  to
public  services)  which  may  also influence  the  poverty  line. Thus  we  write  the
poverty  line  z as:
z  =  z(,e)  (1)
where  A  is  the  mean income  and  e denotes  an unobserved  random  variable  with
zero  mean,  reflecting  the  non-income  factors  and  measurement  errors  in z.  A
natural  interpretation  of the  "absolute  poverty  line"  is Z(Amin,O),  where  Amin
is the  lowest  observed  mean income. Equation  (1)  might  also  be used to define
local  poverty  lines,  including  for  those  countries  for  which  z has  not  been
estimated,  but  M is  known.
iii)  Building  on the  above  argument,  one  can  suggest  a rather  different
interpretation  of an "absolute  poverty  line"  for  cross-country  comparisons.
Suppose,  in  particular,  that  there  exits  a unique  fixed  point  of equation  (1),
denoted  z , such  that4
z  =z(z*,  O) and z 2 Z  if and only if z <  z  (2)
The meaning of z* can be understood as follows.  Consider countries with
"typical"  values of the non-income factors (E-O), and with  A  >  z*.  A resident
with the average income in such a country is not poor by the standards of .nat
country.  Or, equivalently, if the average income could be equally
distributed, nobody would be poor in that country.  Consider instead a
resident with the mean income of some country with A  <  z ;  that person is poor
by the standards of that country - if the average income could be equally
distributed everyone would be poor.  For cross-country comparisons, z* is thus
one possible candidate for an absolute poverty line, interpreted as the level
of income below which a "typical"  citizen of a country would be deemed "poor"f
by the standards of that country.1
In the empirical work we will quantify each of these approaches to the
definition of an absolute poverty line.
3.  An International Comparison of Poverty Lines
Many countries now have reasonably well established (though rarely un-
contentious) local poverty lines.  From a wide range of sources within and
outside the World Bank, we have compiled the local poverty lines for 33
countries, both developing and developed.  These should not be considered as
"official"  poverty lines, either of the governments or the Bank.  Many are the
estimates of independent researchers.  Nor has our survey been exhaustive;
there are undoubtedly credible poverty lines we do not know about.  When more
than one pove;ty line was found (such as for urban and rural areas), the
lowest was used.  Appendix 1 gives the results and sources.5
'Ihere  are  very likely  to  be measurement  errors  in  our series  on poverty
lines,  either  because  of the inrompleteness  of our survey,  or errors  in the
primary  data.  However,  to the  best  of our  knowledge,  those  errors  are  random
and, in  particular,  uncorrelated  with  average  incomes. Thus  we do not  belie:ve
that  these  errcrs  will  bias  our  econometric  estimates,  and  hence,  our
estimates  of the  absolute  poverty  line  for  cross-country  comparisons.
In  converting  local  poverty  lines  to a  common  currency,  and indeed  for
all such  comparisons  in  this  study,  we have  used the  estimates  presented  by
Summers  and  Heston  (1988)  of the  adjustments  to  official  exchange  rates  needed
to  give  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP). Ideally  one  would  like  to  construct
new  PPP  rates  for  the  prices  most  relevant  to the  absolute  poor,  in  which  the
prices  of food-staples  would  clearly  carry  a high  weight.
The  results  of our  survey  of  poverty  lines  are  plotted  agaicist  mean
incomes  in  Figure  1. Mean income  is  measured  by private  consumption  per
capita, and both variables are for 1985 and are measured at PPP, using local
CPI's  when necessary. Figure  2 gives  a "blow-up"  of the  part  of Figure  1 for
developing countries only.  India's poverty line is  '4  per person per
month.
There is a clear tendency for the local poverty line to increase with
.mean  income, though dispersion in poverty lines at most income levels is also
evident, presuniably  reflecting non-income factors and/or measurement errors.
The poverty line is below the mean in all cases.  The Figure also gives our
fitted values of the poverty lines.  In modelling the variation in poverty
lines we assume the following semi-log functional form for equation (1):
log(zi) - B3 +  Blgi +  B2(gi)2 +  ei  i-l,..  ,33  (3)6
The  ordinary  least  squares  estimates  of these  p.rameters  from  the  data in
Table  1  are  as follows  (with  standard  errors  in  parentheses): 2
log(z) - 3.077  +  .0033 4u - .0000011A 2 (4)
(.105)  (.00056) (.0000004)
R2-.90; SEE-.292;  Mean  d.v.-  4.04;
LM tests: NORM(2)-1.3; HETERO(l)-.21; RESET(l)-.22.
The  actual  and  predicted  values  of z implied  by the  above  regression  are
plotted  in  Figures  1  and  2.  A test  was  also  made for  a structural  braak  in
the  model  between  the  developing  and  industrialized  countries,  but this  failed
to  reject  the  null-hypothesis  that  the  same  model  is  valid  for  both.
The lowest  meaa  consumption  amongst  the  86  countries  studied  in the
ReDort is Somalia at $22 per person per month in 1985 PPP prices.  At this
point,  equation  (4)  predicts  a poverty  line  of $23,  only slightly  higher  than
that of India.  Furthermore the "fixed point" of equation (4) is also $23 to
the nearest dollar (the fixed point was estimated  by a line search).  Thus,
all three definitions of the "absolute poverty line" discussed above give
roughly the same figure.  There is clearly a strong case for considering
India's poverty line to be . reasonable lower bound to the absolute poverty
line  for  the  developing  world.
However, it is also clear from Figure 1, that  many low-income countries
have more generous poverty lines.  The $23 line is certainly on the low side
of the range found amongst the poorest dozen or so countries in Figure 2.  A
more generous, and more representative, absolute poverty lire for low-income
countries is $31, which (to the nearest dollar) is shared by six of the
countries in Table 1, namely Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Kenya, Tanzania,
and Morocco, and two other countries are close to this figure (Philippines  and7
Pakistan). We shall  use  both these  poverty  lines,  interpreting  the  lower  line
as defining  "extreme  absolute  poverty".
A further  question  which  the  above  results  can  throw  some l;ht on is  the
extent  to  which  the  poverty  lines  of  poor countries  might  be expected  to
increase  in the  future,  with increases  in  average  living  standards. W;e  do not
have time-series  data  on  how  poverty  lines  have evolved  over  time,  but the
cross-sectional  evidence  in Figure  1 is  suggestive.  Here  we find  that,
although  higher  mean incomes  are  associated  with  higher  poverty  lines,  the
poverty  line  tends  to  be less  responsive  to increases  in  the  mean at low
income  levels. At mean  consumption  per  capita  of $234  the  elasticity  of z
with respect  to A implied  by equation  (4)  is .66.  However,  at the income  of
India,  the  elasticity  is  very  much lower,  at .15. At the lowest  income  it
falls  to 0.07.  In short:  the  cross-country  comparison  does  suggest  that  real
poverty lines will tend to increase  with growth, but they will do so very
slowly for the poorest countries.  Notions of "absolute poverty" appear to be
relevant to low income count-ies, while "relative  poverty" is of more
relevance to high income countries.
For our purposes, it is not unreasonable then to assume the same real
absolute poverty line across all develeping countries; two persons with the
same real (PPP adjusted) income livL.,g  in different countries will have the
same measured poverty.  This does not allow for differences between countries
in relevant  "non-income factors", such as access by the poor to public
services.8
4.  Poverty  Measures  and  their  Estimation  from  DistributLonal  Data
A wide range  of existing  poverty  measures  can  be characterized  by a
function  P(z/A,L)  which  denotes  the  measured  level  of poverty  in an  economy  in
which  the  absolute  poverty  line  is  z, tt.e  mean lin.-ome*  (or  other  suitable
measure  of living  standards)  is  j.,  and the  di.tribution  of income  has the
Lorenz  curve  L, which  can  be interpreted  as a  vector  of  parameters  which  fully
characterize  the  structure  of relative  inequalities  with the  eczonomy.  The
poverty  line  z  may also  be viewed  as a function  of  1s  (and  possibly  L),
reflecting  'relative  poverty"  considerations,  though  for  the  present
discussion  we will treat  z as fixed. The  function  P is  homc'geneous  of degree
zero in  z and  A; this  is  a very  common  property  of poverty  measures,  and is
unrestrictive.  (Notice  that  the  use  of a  poverty  line  which  is  a fixed
proportion  of the  mean  makes  the  poverty  measure  solely  a function  of the
Lorenz  curve;  it  might  then  be interpretable  as  a measure  of inequality).  We
also  assume  that  P is  strictly  increasing  in  z/A; this  is  a sensible  property
for  any  poverty  measure.
One  quite  straightforward  approach  to  estimating  P(z/4,L)  is to combine
an estimate  of the  "world  Lorenz  curve"  with  our  poverty  lines,  and  an
estimate of mean world income.  There have been a number of estimates of the
world  Lorenz  curve.3 Early  attempts  ignored  inequality  within  countries,  but
the  more recent  studies  have  used  distributional  data for  a  sub-set  of
countries,  and  assumed  homogeneity  wit  i  incomes  groups  (usually  deciles)  in
aggregation. The  most  recently  available  world  Lorenz  curve  is  for  1986
(Berry  et al., 1989),  though  this  is  based  on 1970  Lorenz  curves  for
individual  countries  (a  sample  of about  20  countries). The  world  Lorenz  curve9
is  then  up-dated  solely  according  to  country  specific  growth  rates  in  national
income.
Nonetheless,  this  may still  give  a  satisfactory  estimate,  if  relative
inequalities  within  countries  have  changed  little  over  the  period  1970-1986,
or if the  world  Lorenz  curve  is insenlsitive  to  whatever  changes  have  occurred.
Perry  et al., (1983,  1989)  defend  their  estimates  along  these  lines,  and thexc
earlier  paper  presents  evidence  indicating  that  their  measures  of world
inequality  would  respond  little  (in  elasticity  terms)  to changes  in  inequality
within  most  countries. However,  their  results  do indicate  quite  high
elastitities  (over  1 for  the  world  Theil  index  with  respect  to  the  national
index)  for  some  of the  larger  countries,  including  China  and India.  Some  up-
dating  of at least  these  key  distributions  is clearly  called  for,  and is
feasible;  for  example,  we now  have  quite  recent  estimates  of distributions  for
both China  and  India. It  may  also  be noted  that  we are interested  in
'  asuring poverty here, not inequality per se, and aggregate poverty measures
can be quite sensitive to certain shifts in the Lorenz curve, a point which we
will return to later.
In the light of these considerations, this study will try to exploit the
fact that much more recent, and probably more reliable, distributional data
have become available since 1970; indeed, all of the distributions we shall
use are for the 1980s.  We shall thus start fresh.  It will be of .nterest to
compare the results with those obtained using the Berry et al. world Lorenz
curve for 1986.
When our data for a given country include a usable distribution of
household  consumption  or income,  we proceed  by first  estimating  the  parameters
of the Lorenz curve L, and then we combine this with an estimate of z/j to10
calculate P accotding to the explicit functional form appropriate to the
specific poverty measure being considered (as discussed later).
This still leaves  many countries for which adequate distributional data
are unavailable.  When we do not have an empirical distribution, we use an
econometric extrapolation based on available correlates of poverty over the
sub-set of countries with such data.  This is probably a better practice than
assuming that the available distributions are representative.  Section 5
discusses the extrapolation method in detail.
Given an explicit functional form for P, the contribution of changes in
average incomes (for given distributions) to  poverty alleviation can be
estimated.  A useful "benchmark" case is that of distributionally neutral
growth, defined as an increase in  M holding L constant.  However, this should
only be viewed as a benchmark; there can be no presumption that growth is
distributionally neutral, and from past experiences the departures from
neutrality could go either way.
The specific functional form  of P(z/M,L) depends on i) the functional
form of the pom rty measure and ii) the parameterization of the Lorenz curve.
The rest of this section discusses the assumptions we have made about
functional forms in detail.
Two specific poverty measures are considered: the headcount index (H)
given by the proportion of the population with incomes below the poverty line,
and the income gap ratio (G) given by the average income distance of the poor
from the poverty line, expressed as a proportion of the poverty line.  Thus,
letting F denote the cumulative distribution of income, we have that H - F(z)
and G - 1 - MP/z, where jP  is the mean income of the poor.  There are
advantages in following Foster et al. (1984) in  normalizing the irndex  by11
population size, rather than the number of poor.  We then obtain the poverty
gap ratio defined as PG-G.H.4 This is a more computationally convenient
normalization, as it implies that the aggregate measure across a-.y  number of
sub-groups is (like H) simply the population weighted mean of the sub-group
values of PG.  That is not the only advantage.  The additivity property also
guarantees that measured poverty is sub-group monotonic, meaning that if
p verty increases (decreases) within a sub-group then (ceteris paribus)
aggregate poverty will also increase (decrease) (Foster et al., 1984).
There are a number of options in specifying a parametric form for the
Lorenz curve.  We considered three possibilities: the original Kakwani and
Podder (1973) specification, the later  Kakwani specification (Kakwani, 1989),
and the class of elliptical Lorenz curves (Villasenor  and Arnold, 1989).  All
three can be readily estimated econometrically.
To test their performance, we compared their fit on the 1984 empirical
Lorenz curve for Indonesia (Ravallion and Huppi, 1989).5  Table 1 gives the
results obtained.  Both the Kakwani and elliptical models clearly yield a
better fit than the Kakwani-Podder model.  The ranking of the Kakwani and
elliptical models is less clear; the standard deviation of the error is
slightlv lower for the elliptical model, though this is mainly due to its
better fit at the upper end of the distribution.  The Kakwani model clearly
fits better at the lower end, and this is where accuracy in poverty
measurement will be most affected.6  The computer program we have written for
the WDR calculations allows both specifications, though the Kakwani
specification has generally been preferred.
The calculation of the two poverty measures, H and PG, proceeds as
follows.  Let L(p) denote the Lorenz curve, giving the estimated proportion of12
income  held  by the  poorest  p% of  the  population.  H can  be obtained  using  the
well-known  fact that  x-gL'(p)  is  the  inverse  function  of the  distribution
function  p-F(x),  and  so L'(H)  - z/.. This  has to  be solved  numerically  for
both  Lorenz  curve  specifications,  though  the  problem  is  straightforward
(Newton's  method  was  used  here). The  poverty  gap  is then  obtained  readily
using  the  fact  that  AP - ML(H)/H.
These  methods  will  not  always  work  well.  For  example,  if there  are  very
few  class  intervals  in  the  available  data  for the  poor,  then  any  estimate  of
poverty  will  be subject  to error. Also,  certain  groupings  of the  data  can
yield  distorted  estimates  of the  Lorenz  curve;  for  example,  econometric
estimates  of the  parameters  may  not  satisfy  the  theoretical  conditions
required  of a Lorenz  curve.7 The  program  written  to perform  these
calculations  checks  those  conditions  and  uses  quadratic  or linear
interpolation  as options.8
One  obvious  determinant  of the  accuracy  of the  resulting  estimates  is  the
accuracy  of the input  data. This is  not  just  a matter  of  measurement  error  in
the  original  surveys  (which  can  be  a  serious  problem  in its  own  right)  but it
also involves  the  way the  survey  results  have  been presented,  and,  in
particular,  the  number  of income  class  intervals  presented  for  the  lower  end
of the  distribution.  Our computer  program  includes  obvious  checks  such  as
whether  the  estimated  headcount  index  lies  within  the  bounds  of the  relevant
interval  in the  grouped  data.  (If  it  does  not then  the  quadratic
interpolation  method  is used). But  ultimately  one  has little  option  but to
rely  on the  most detailed  grouped  data  available.13
To help assess the accuracy of these methods, Table 2 presents an
experiment we conducted, in which we estimated poverty in Indonesia for 1984
using z-$31, and alternatively calculated using:
i) the primary data tapes of the SUSENAS surveys of household consumption
(from  Ravallion and Huppi, 1989),
ii) parameterized Lorenz curves (using the Kakwani specification)
calibrated to a detailed description of the frequency distribution based on 50
class intervals formed from the unit record data, of which 18 intervals are
below the poverty line,
iii) Lorenz curves calibrated to far more "coarse" frequency
distributions using 15, 10, and 5 class intervals,  of which 8, 4, and 2
respectively are below the poverty line.  These are typical of the detail
usually available from published sources.  With the more aggregated data it is
also very common for the poverty line to fall well within a class interval.
We also present results for this case, where we have constructed grouped
distributions in which the povertv line is in the middle of a class interval.
The results confirm a loss of accuracy in using grouped data, though it
is not large; the headcount index, for example, is estimated within three-
quarters of a percentage point using the grouped data.  Furthermore, the loss
of accuracy is remarkably unaffected by contraction in the number of class
intervals in the grouped data.  We do not know how specific this result is to
these data (as we rarely have access to the unit record data).  However, it
does suggest that there need not be much loss of accuracy in using even highly
aggregated data for measuring poverty.
Problems of comparison across countries are another source of error in
the aggregate estimates.  Available distributions generally pertain to either14
household income or consumption at one point in time, and are either household
aggregates or are normalized by the number of persons in the household.  Our
first preference was to use a distribution of household consumption per
person.  When not available, income distributions were used instead, adjusted
pro rata according to an average propensity to consume estimated from national
accounts.  If the distribution was in household form, we adjusted it according
to either income specific or average household sizes, for  which purpose one
has no choice but to assume that the ranking of households is the same.
All currency conversions use constant purchasing power exchange rates,
based on Summers and Heston (1988).  For two countries, Burma and China, PPP
rates are not given in this source.  We estimated these from an extrapolation
model of the PPP rates across the other 84 countries.  The variables used for
extrapolation were the official exchange rate, the mean income at official
exchange rates, and various social indicators.  For both countries, the
constant PPP exchange rate is  estimated to be about one quarter of the
official rate.  Appendix 2 gives details cn the model used.9  The estimated
PPP for China as a proportion of the official exchange rate is 23%, which is
very close to the estimate for 1975 reported by Kravis (1981)  of 24% (using
the geometric mean of PPP estimates based on US and China expenditure
weights).
However, imprecision in the estimated PPP for China is likely to be an
important source of imprecision in the final poverty estimates, given the
country's population share and (as  we will see later) the high elasticity of
the country's distribution function in the region of the poverty lines.  We
shall return to this point.15
Appendix 3  gives summary information on the data and the estimation
methods used for the 22 countries for which adequate distributional data were
available.  Data are known to exist for other countries, but were either not
available, or deemed inadequate for our purposes.  The average population size
of this set of countries is much higher than the average for the 86 countries,
so that these 22 countries represent 76Z of the total population covered.
Poverty counts for the remaining countries have been based on extrapolations.
The next section outlines the  methodology.
5.  ExtraRolations When Distributional Data are Unavailable
The extrapolations have been based on a set of variables which are
available in a fairly complete series across the 86 countries.  These
variables include mean consumptions for 1985 as estimated from national
accounts and converted to constant $US using the 1985 PPP deflators, and a set
of social indicators, including life expectancy, infant and child mortality,
primary and secondary school enrollment rates, proportion of the population in
the labor force, female labor force participation, and the share of the
population living in urban areas.  Denoting these variables by the vector x,
the extrapolations are based on the following econometric model estimated for
the countries for which the distributional data are available:
log(Hi/(l-Hi))  =  xi
7 +  Ei  (5)
where i is a vector of parameters to be estimated and e  is  a suitable random
error term.  A similar model was estimated for PG.  The logit transformation
of both poverty measures is used to guarantee that the predicted values of the
measure are within the cheoretical bounds (0,1) and that e  is theoretically16
un-bounded.  Initial runs of the model were based on a wide set of social
indicators and their multiplicative interactions, and only variables with
standard errors less than the estimated coefficients were deleted, aiming to
minimize the regression's standard error of estimate.  The final model for
the headcount index across 22 countries using the upper poverty line
($31/month) is as follows:
log(H/(l-H)) - (-1.19 - .18PPP/X)logu  +  3.26logIMR - .0014LE.IMR  - .014U




R' - .80;  SEE - .57;  Mean d.v.- -1.37;
LM tests: NORM(2)-.31; HETERO(l)-.13; RESET(l)-l.5.  (6)
where M  denotes private consumption per capita evaluated at PPP, X is the
official exchange rates, IMR is the infant  mortality rate, LE is life
expectancy at birth, WLF is the proportion of the labor force who are women,
and U is the proportion of the population living in  urban areas.  Similar
results were obtained for the lower poverty line, and the poverty gap index,
for both poverty lines.
Figure 3 gives the "actual" and "fitted" values of the headcount index of
poverty for the upper poverty line; the correlation coefficient is .93.  The
figure also highlights the points for the two largest countries, China and
India.  The estimate from distributional data is below the regression line for
China (though the difference is small), and above it for India (a somewhat
larger discrepancy).  The reasonably close fit for China is reassuring given
that the country's PPP rate had to be estimated.  Overestimation of the PPP
would tend to push the 'actual" headcount index above the regression line,17
rather than below it, noting that the fitted value is less responsive to
changes in the PPP than is the actual value; as we shall discuss below the
elasticity of China's headcount index with respect to jh  is high.  (The
elasticity of the right hand side of equation 6 w.r.t. the PPP is 1.1.  The
elasticity of the left hand side is 2.7, using the arc elasticity of H
between the two poverty lines.)
It should also be noted that there are many potentially important country
specific effects which will not be captured by the extrapolation model.  This
is of no concern for the sample of 22 countries (as  we shall, of course, use
the actual values for those countries).  But it is more worrying for the other
countries.  For example, Egypt's extensive food subsidy program has
undoubtedly reduced poverty below the value that equation 6 would predict.
And there are no doubt other countries for which the opposite is true.
On the whole, however, the within sample predictive performance of the
extrapolation models seems adequate for the purpose of estimating aggregate
poverty in the countries for which distributional data are unavailable.
However, the individual country extrapolations should be treated as very
approximate.  We shall calculate standard errors for the aggregate measures.
6.  The Estimates of Aggregate Poverty in the Developing Countries
Our estimates of both poverty measures for both poverty lines for the 86
developing countries are given in Table 3.  About one in three persons in the
developing countries fail to attain our upper poverty line, while one in five
do not reach our lower line, defining extreme poverty.  The combined
population size of the countries covered is 3,442 million, so the estimated
total number of poor is 1,137 million, of which 645 million are deemed to live18
in  extreme  poverty. We shall  consider  some  implications  of these  results  in
the  following  section.
It  should  go without  saying  that  these  are rough  estimates  only.  There
are  a number  of sources  of imprecision  in the  estimation  methods. Most  are
familiar,  such  as measurement  errors  in  the  underlying  distributions,  or
errors  in the  estimated  PPP  rates. One  source  of error,  on  which  we can
readily  zomment  further,  is  our  use  of extrapolations  for  those  countries  for
which  adequate  distributional  data  were  unavailable.  We have calculated  the
95%  confidence  interval  around  the  point  estimate  for  each  of the  countries
for  which  extrapolations  have  been  used.  The  poverty  measures  for  the  22
countries  for  which  we have  used distributional  data  are  assumed  to be
measured  without  error. The implied  confidence  intervals  around  the  aggregate
point  estimates  are  given  in  parentheses  in  Table  3.
The  aggregate  headcount  index  is  found  in the  range  28-39%  with  95%
confidence  using  the  upper  poverty  line  and  15-25%  using  the  lower  line. The
corresponding  confidence  intervals  for  our  estimates  of  the  numbers  of  poor
are  960-1348  millions  and 513-876  millions.
Another  source  of error  is in the  estimation  of a PPP  rate  for  China's
currencv. This is  worrying  for  two  reasor  . Firstly,  although  povertr  is
below  average  in  China,  given  the  country's  size it  still  accounts  for  a large
share  of aggregate  poverty. Secondly,  the  income  distribution  function  for
China  is  unusually  steep  in the  region  of the  poverty  lines;  our  estimates  of
the  headcount  index  at the  upper  and  lower  poverty  lines  imply  an elasticity
of 3.7 (as  compared  to  an elasticity  of about  two  for  the  developing  countries
as a whole). This  undoubtedly  reflects  distributional  policy  in  China. By
implication,  aggregate  poverty  measures  will  be quite  sensitive  to errors  in19
measuring the PPP rate of exchange for China;  the elasticity of the aggregate
headcount index at the lower poverty line with respect to China's PPP rate
will be about .54.  Suppose, for example, our PPP rate has been oveL-testimated
by 10%.  This would imply about a 5% overestimation in the aggregate headcount
index,  which would fall  by one percentage point, or about 35 million people.
Table 3 also gives the regional breakdown of the poverty measures, both
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals.  The confidence intervals for
the upper poverty line are plotted in Figure 4.  The estimates are clearly far
more accurate for some regions than others.  In particular, while we have used
distributional data for three-quarters of the aggregate population, such data
were only available for 11% of the population of the Middle East and North
Africa region and a mere 6% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa.  At the
other extreme, the Asia coverage is excellent, being 95% of the population of
South Asia, and 97% of the population of East Asia.  (The Latin America
coverage is 55%, while  for  Eastern  Europe  ic ts 85%).  These regional
variations in surv.  coverage are clearly reflected in the 95%  confidence
intervals around the point estimates given in  Table 4.  While  we can be
reasonably confident about our estimates for South Asia, for example, very
wide margins for error must be allowed around those for Sub-Saharan Africa and
the Middle-East/North-Africa.
Subject to this (important)  caveat, we find that for the upper poverty
lines the highest headcount index is for South Asia, closely followed by Sub-
Saharan Africa.  However, this order reverses for the lower poverty line.  The
same observation holds for the poverty gap index.  Loosely speaking, the
incidence and severity of "moderate" absolute poverty can be said to be20
highest  in South  Asia,  while  that  of "extreme"  poverty  is  highest  in Sub-
Saharan  Africa.
It should  be recalled  that  these  poverty  assessments  will not  necessarily
accord  with local  perceptions  of  poverty,  since  we  have used fixed  absolute
poverty  lines  across  all  countries. For  example,  our  counts  for  Latin  America
will  seem  low to  observers  familiar  with the  results  obtained  using  the
(typically)  higher  poverty  lines  of that  region. Conversely,  our  counts  for
some  regions  will  seem  high.  For  example,  a commonly  used  poverty  line  for
China  translates  into  about  $25  per  person  per  month  at our  estimated  PPP
rate.  This is  well  below  our  upper  poverty  line,  and (as  we have  already
discussed)  China's  distribution  is  very steep  in this  region,  so our figure
for  the  upper  poverty  line  is much  higher  than  local  assessments. Our lower
poverty  line  is  more  consistent  with  perceptions  of poverty  in  China.
7.  An Alternative  Estimate  Based  on the  Berry  et al..  World  Lorenz  Curve.
As an aside,  it is  of interest  to compare  our  results  with  an alternative
method  of estimating  aggregate  poverty  using  the  Berry  et al., (1989)  estimate
of the  world  Lorenz  curve  of consumption  for  1986  (based  on 1970
distributions,  and  naJional  growth  rates  over  the  intervening  period). From
the  results  of Summers  and  Heston  (1988),  we estimate  mean  consumption  per
capita  of the  non-socialist  countries  to  be $230  per  person  per  month  in 1935
at PPP. 10 Table  5  gives  our  estimates  of  both  poverty  measures  for  both
poverty  lines." 1 We also  give  an estimate  which  includes  our figure  for
China. The total  population  covered  is then  4,278  million,  and the  main
difference  in  coverage  over  the  earlier  results  is that  this  now includes  the
industrialized  countries. It is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  number  of21
persons  in the  industrialized  countries  who  do not  attain  these  very low
poverty  lines  (by  the  standards  of those  countries)  would  be negligible. Thus
the  estimated  numbers  of poor  should  be comparable  with those  we obtained
earlier.
We find  that  there  are 1031  and  691  million  for  the  upper  and  lower
poverty  lines  respectively,  by this  alternative  estimation  method,  as compared
to 1137  and  645  million  by our  earlier  method. The  two  methods  are in
reasonably  close  accord.
S.  Some Implications
There  is  only  so  much one  can  learn  from  a single  "snapshot"  of poverty.
However,  a number  of observations  of possible  interest  can  be made about  our
main  results  in  Table  3.
We are  clearly  looking  at a fairly  steep  segment  of the  income
distribution  function  for  the  developing  countries;  in going  from  the  lower  to
the  higher  poverty  line  in  Table  3 the  headcount  index  increases  from  19%  to
33%,  representing  an elasticity  of 2.2.12 This implies  that,  in the  region  of
these  poverty  lines,  the  headcount  index  of  poverty  will  decrease  with  an
elasticity  of 2.2  under  distributionally  neutral  growth  (recalling  that  the
poverty  measure  is  homogeneous  of degree  zero  in z  and  4).
For  example,  at a growth  rate  in real  mean income  of 1% per  year,  and
without  any  change  in relative  inequalities,  the  headcount  index  will decline
at about  2%  per  year.  If  the  rate  of population  growth  does  not exceed  this
amount,  then  the  number  of poor  will  also  decline. In fact,  the  average  rate
of population  growth  in  the  developing  countries  is  about  2% per  year,  so the
total  number  of  poor  will  be in decline  as long  as the  developing  countries22
can  attain  a distributionally  neutral  growth  rate in  mean income  of at least
1X  per  year.
The  aggregate  poverty  gap is 10%  and  5%  of the  poverty  line  for  the  upper
and lower  poverty  lines  respectively.  This  can  also  be expressed  as a
proportion  of mean income.  (The  aggregate  poverty  gap  as a proportion  of
aggregate  income  is  given  by PG times  z/g.) The  mean income  of the  sample  of
86  countries  is $102  per  person  per  month  in 1985,  at PPP.  Thus the  aggregate
poverty  gap  represents  3.1%  and  1.1%  of aggregate  income  for  the  upper  and
lower  poverty  lines  respectively.  Also recall  that  this  calculation  uses the
aggregate  income  of the  developing  countries;  the  proportion  of aggregate
income  of the  non-socialist  countries  is  a good  deal lower  at 1.5X  and .5%
respectively.
Provided  that  income  gains  could  be perfectly  targeted  to the  poor,  and
without  reducing  mean income,  these  calculations  suggest  that  only  modest
gains  to the  poor  would  be needed  to  eliminate  poverty. For  example,  with
less  than  one  half of one  percent  of world  income  perfectly  targeted  without
distortion,  one  could  guarantee  that  everyone  in the  world  could  reach  at
least  India's  poverty  line.
However,  neither  of these  provisos  should  be taken  lightly. For  example,
the  information  needed  for  perfect  non-distortionary  targeting  to the  poor is
not  readily  available,  and  may, indeed,  be  very costly  to  obtain. The
potential  impact  on  poverty  of informationally  feasible  targeting  may  be far
more  modest  (see,  for  example,  the  simulations  reported  in  Ravallion,  1990,
and  Datt  and  Ravallion,  1990). To illustrate  how  much informational
constraints  could  tite into  the  impact  on poverty  suppose  instead  that
absolutely  no targeting  was  possible  i.e.,  each  person  receives  the  same23
income  gain,  irrespective  of their  initial  position. Assuming  that  the  lowest
income  is  zero,  the  transfer  needed  to  eliminate  poverty  would  be the
proportion z/I of total income.  Clearly this is  very much higher than the
amount  needed  to  eliminate  poverty  with  perfect  targeting;  the  necessary
proportion  of the  aggregate  income  of the  non-socialist  countries  would  be 13%
and  10%  for  the  upper  and  lower  poverty  lines  respectively.  Thus,  depending
on the information  available  for  targeting,  between  .5  and  10%  of aggregate
income  would  be needed  to  guarantee  that  nobody  in  the  developing  world  falls
below  Tndia's  poverty  line. Of course,  in  practice  we will  at least  know
countries  of residence  and  this  will  undoubtedly  be a useful  indicator  for
targeting.  The 10%  estimate  could  be well above  the  actual  cost  of
eliminating poverty with readily available information.
Our results can also throw light on the prospects for alleviating povecty
through economic growth.  The point elasticity of the poverty gap index with
respect to distributionally neutral growth is given by 1 - H/PG (also equal to
-AP/(z-AP)), and can be readily calculated from the data in Table  The
implied absolute elasticities are 2.2 and 2.7 for  the  upper  and  lower  poverty
lines respectively.  At a growth rate in the mean of 1% per year, and without
any  change  in  relative  inequalities,  the  mean  poverty  gap  will  decrease  at  a
rate of 2-3% par year, over the range of poverty lines considered.
However, deviations from distributionally neutral grow;.h  can matter to
the future prospects for reducing absolute pGverty.  This will depend on the
way in which Lorenz curves shift.  Following Kakwani (1989) let us assume that
the shift in the Lorenz curve L(p) at each value of p is directly proportional
to p - L(p) i.e., the Lorenz curve shifts by a constant proportion of the
difference between each income group's actual share of total income, and the24
share it wovld have if there were perfect equality.  We cannot know if this is
plausible, though it has been found to give an excellent approximation to
recent shifts in Indonesia's Lorenz curve (Ravallion  and Hluppi,  1989).  It
also yields quite a close approximation to the shifts in world Lorenz curves
from 1960 to 1986, and from 1970 to 1986, reported by Berry et al., (1989).13
Under this assumption, the elasticity of the poverty gap index with
respect to the Gini index is given by l+(H/PG)[(ji/z)-l)  (Kakwani, 1989).
Notice that this takes a value of 1 if the poverty litne  equals the mean.
Thus, for example, the elasticity is found to be around one for Bangladesh
(Ravallion, 1990).  However, for the developing countries as a whole (and,
indeed, the world distribution), the poverty line is low relative to the mean.
When combined with the "skew" in the aggregate Lorenz curve associated with
the disparities in  means across countries, this has the effect that the
elasticity of poverty with respect to the Gini index can be very much higher
than 1.
This is exactly what we find from our results in Table 3.  The elasticity
of the poverty gap is 8.4 for the higher puverty line, and 13.6 for the lower
one.  Thus even small deviations from distributionally neutral growth could
have a significant impact on progress in reducing world poverty.  Consider
again the effect of a 1Z growth rate in  mean income, representing a 16X
increase in the mean over the 15 years from 1985 till the end of this century.
The entire effect of this gain in average income on the poverty gap for our
higher poverty line would be wiped out if it was associated with a 4.3X
increase in the Gini index over this 15 year period.  For the lower poverty
line it  would take a 3.1X increase in the Gini index.25
A 3-4% increase in the Gini index between 1985 and 2000 is not
inconceivable; for example, Berry et al., (1989) report that the world Gini
index increased by 5%  between 1960 and 1986, and by 3% between 1970 and 1986.
Taking their estimate of the world Gini index for consumption in 1986 of 0.67,
a 4% increase would bring this up to 0.70 by 2000.  This would be equivalent
to a lump-sum transfer of 6% of the world mean, from each person below the
median to each person above it, over 15 years (or about 0.4% of the mean per
year).14
Another way to gauge the implications of our results for future poverty
reduction is to ask: How many years at a given growth rate would pass before a
person with the average income of the poor crossed the poverty line; see
Kanbur (1987), who calls this the "cross-over time".  The income gain needed
to bring the average income of the poor in 1985 up to the poverty line is
readily calculated from the H and PG poverty measures, as follows:  Mean
income of the poor is z(l-PG/H).  The cross-over time if incomes of the poor
grow at the rate of r% per year is given by log[H/(H-PG)]/log(l+r/l00).
Figure 5 gives the values of chis expression implied  by the results of Table 3
for both poverty lines and various growth rates.  For example, at a 1% growth
rate in mean income of the poor, it  will take about 32 years to bring the
average poor person (i.e., a person with the average income of the poor) up to
an income per capita of $23 per month.  It would take an additional 5 years to
get the average poor person up to $31 per month.  At a growth rate of 2% it
will take half this time.
One can also calculate the rate of growth in incomes of the poor needed
to bring the average poor person up to the poverty line in a specified time
period.  For example, the growth rate in incomes of the poor needed to do this26
by the year 2000 from a 1985 base date is given by (exp(log[H/(H-PG))/15) -
1)100.  The necessary growth rate is 2.5% per year for the higher poverty
line, and 2.1% for the lower one.
Thus, the growth rates needed to  bring a typical poor person up to the
poverty line are not particularly high.  Many developing countries have been
able to attain these growth rates in national income over recent times (much
of Sub-Saharan Africa being an important  exception).  Provided that the poor
share at least proportionally in that growth, the prospects for the
alleviation of absolute poverty look good.
But again it should be emphasized that this proviso is  very important.
For example, while a distributionally neutral growth rate of 2% per year would
bring the average income of the poor in 1985 up to $31 per month in roughly 2
decades, if the same national growth rate was only associated with a 1% annual
gain in average income of the poor, then it  would take nearly 4 decades to do
so.  Conversely, if the 2% growth rate in the national mean was associated
with a 3% growth rate in the income of a typical  poor person in 1985, then
that person should be able to cross even our higher absolute poverty line
before the end of the century.
9.  Conclusions
Our aim here has been to quantify the magnitude of absolute poverty, when
assessed by the standards of the poorest countries.  Thus we have used the
same poverty line (adjusted for differences in purchasing power) for all
developing countries, and we have chosen that line to accord with observed
poverty lines in the poorest countries.  Not unsurprisingly, much higher
poverty lines are found in middle and high income  countries, and with growth27
in  mean incomes it is  plausible that poverty lines of the poorest countries
will need to be raised, to reflect rising living standards generally.
However, from our cross-sectional comparisons of poverty lines at various
income levels, it appears that the relationship between a country's poverty
line and mean income tends to be quite flat at low income levels.  It appears
that "relative poverty" considerations only emerge strongly at fairly high
incomes.  Thus it can be argued that absolute poverty lines for the poorest
countries will change very little as growth initially proceeds, and it is not
unreasonable to use a common absolute poverty line.
A strong case can be made for treating a consumption level of $23 per
person per month in 1985 as a reasonable lower bound for the poverty line.
This has been widely used in poverty assessments for India, and we have
suggested other arguments which make that figure compelling.  However, for
comparative purposes it is also worth corsidering a rather less meager
criterion.  We find that a consumption level of $31 per month is actually a
far more common poverty line amongst the dozen or so low income countries for
which povertv lines have been calculated.  The range $23-31 embraces quite
well the poverty lines used by low income countries.
In measuring the  magnitude and severity of absolute poverty in the
developing countries, we have used recentlv available distributions of
consumption or (occasionally) income for a sub-set of countries, accounting
fir about three-quarters of the total population covered by the estimates.  We
have then used regression models calibrated to data on average incomes and
various social indicators for that subset to extrapolate to the remaining
quarter of the population.  Allow'.ng  only for imprecision in the
extrapolations, our method yields acceptably low variances in estimates of28
aggregate  poverty. We have also  considered  an alternative  methodology,  based
on recent  estimates  of a  world  Lorenz  curve. Allowing  for  the  differences  in
methodology  and  coverage  between  these  two  approaches,  it  is encouraging  that
they  yield  quite  similar  results  on the  magnitude  of absolute  poverty.
However,  it should  go  without  saying  that  these  estimates  are  no better
than  the  quality  of the  underlying  data  allows. We have  made a  number  of
tests  of the  reliability  of our  estimates. Two points  stand  out:
i)  China's  high population  share,  and  the  fact  that  China's  income
distribution  is  particularly  steep  at the  lower  end,  make  our  estimates  of
aggregate  poverty  particularly  sensitive  to errors  in  estimating  the  PPP  rate
for  China.
ii)  The  very limited  coverage  of the  available  distributional  data  for
Africa  has necessitated  the  use  of extrapolations  from  other  data for  most  of
that  region,  giving  greater  imprecision  than  for  other  regions. This  should
be of concern,  particularly  given  the  current  high incidence  of poverty  in  the
region,  and  the  low  expected  growth  rates.
In assessing  the  overall  magnitude  of  poverty  in the  developing  world,  we
estimate  that  about  1,137  million  people  in the  developing  world  did  not
attain  a consumption  level  of  $31  per  month  in 1985. Of these,  645  million
did  not  attain  our  lower,  and  extremely  frugal,  poverty  line.  The  severity  of
poverty  amongst  the  poor  can  be gauged  by their  average  poverty  gap. We find
that  the  average  consumption  of the  poor in  the  developing  world  was  about  27-
31% below  the  poverty  line  (for  lower  and  higher  poverty  lines  respectively).
This  may  be a very  significant  gap  for  a poor  person. But,  despite  the  large
numbers  of poor,  the  aggregate  gap turns  out  to  be a  very  small  proportion  of
world  consumption;  for  example,  the  aggregate  poverty  gap  of the  developing29
countries  at our  slightly  more generous  poverty  line  is  about  1.5X  of the
aggregate  consumption  of the  non-socialist  countries,  falling  to  a mere 0.51
at our lower  poverty  line. This suggests  that,  with  perfect  targeting,  it
would  take  only  a  modest  re-distribution  of world  income  to  bring  everyone  up
to these  minimal  consumption  levels. However,  the  information  available  to
policy  makers  is  generally  a lot  less  than  one  would  need for  perfect
targeting. So this  calculation  may  substantially  under-state  the  magnitude  of
the  transfers  needed  to  eliminate  absolute  poverty  in  practice.
Our results  imply  that  aggregate  poverty  in the  developing  world  will
respond  fairly  elastic;'  ly to distributionally  neutral  growth;  for  example,  a
1%  annual  growth  rate  at all  income  levels  will  reduce  the  proportion  of the
population  who are  poor  by about  2-3%  per  year.  If annual  population  growth
rates  stay  at about  2% or lower,  then  the  total  number  of poor  will  decline.
However,  our  results  also  suggest  that  even  a seemingly  modest  worsening
in distribution could upset this progress in poverty alleviation.  For
example, if the same 1% growth rate in the mean was associated with only a
0.25% annual increase in the world Gini index of inequality, then the
reduction in the poverty gap attainable through growth would be virtually
eliminated (assuming that the Lorenz curve shifts out roughly
"proportionately" at all points).  Such a rate of increase in the  world Gini
index  has been observed over recent decades, associated with the relatively
low growth rates of a number of the poorest countries.  In this case, the
numbers of persons who do not attain even the most meager consumption levels
would almost certainly increase.
By the same token, a pattern of growth more favorable to the poor could
rapidly accelerate global poverty alleviation.  Consider, instead, a rate of30
decrease in the world Gini index of .25%  per year, roughly equivalent to a
transfer of one third of one percent of the world's mean income from the
better off half to the poorer half of the world's population.  This would
roughly double the rate of decrease in the aggregate poverty gap (measured
against our more generous poverty line) associated with a 1% annual growth
rate in mean consumption of the developing countries; instead of the decrease
of 2.2% per year we could  expect  with  distributionally neutral growth, we
would see the poverty gap fall at  an  impressive  annual  rate  of  4.5%.31
Table 1: Alternative Estimates of the Lorenz Curve for Indonesia, 1984
Proportion  Actual  Lorenz curve specification
of the  Lorenz
population  curve  Kakwani-Podder  Kakwani  Elliptical
10  3.40  3.54  3.42  3.52
20  8.14  7.87  8.12  8.15
30  13.82  13.20  13.77  13.77
40  20.42  19.75  20.35  20.36
50  27.97  27.72  27.93  27.95
60  36.62  37.40  36.64  36.64
70  46.57  49.08  46.70  46.65
80  58.40  63.12  58.55  58.43
90  73.31  79.93  73.21  73.18
Table 2: Alternative Estimates of Poverty in Indonesia, 1984
Number of intervals used in
Poverty  Calculated directly  estimation from grouped data:
measure  from unit record data  50  i5  10  5
(sample size-50,000)  (18 "poor") (8 "poor") (4 "poor") (2 "poor")
H: Headcount  33.02  33.74  33.64  33.76  33.50
index (%)  33.88*  33.63*
PG: Poverty gap  8.52  9.10  9.04  9.09  9.07
index (%)  9.17*  9,10*
Foster, Greer  3.17  3.40  3.37  3.39  3.41
and Thorbecke  3.44*  3.41*
measure (a-2,%)
*  Poverty line in the middle of the class interval.32
Table 3: Estimates of Poverty Measures for the Developing Countries 1985
Region  Poverty  Headcount index  Poverty gap index
line  Point  95% confidence  Point  95% confidence
($/ps/mn)  estimate  interval  estimate  interval
Aggregate  31  33.0  (27.9, 39.2)  10.2  (8.4, 14.3)
estimates  23  18.8  (14.9, 25.5)  5.1  (4.0, 8.9)
By region:
South Asia  31  50.9  (49.8, 52.6)  15.9  (15.5, 16.9)
23  29.4  (28.7, 31.1)  7.2  (7.0, 8.1)
of which India:  31  55.0  17.6
23  32.7  8.2
East Asia  31  21.2  (21.1, 21.5)  6.0  (5.9, 6.0)
23  9.7  (9.6, 9.9)  2.8  (2.8, 2.9)
of which China:  31  21.1  5.9
23  9.2  2.9
Sub-Saharan  31  46.9  (18.6, 75.7)  15.0  (5.4, 36.5)
Africa  23  30.5  (8.9,  65.0)  7.7  (2.1, 27.5)
Middle-East and  31  31.0  (13.3, 50.9)  9.6  (3.3, 24.0)
North Africa  23  20.6  (6.4,  42.4)  5.5  (1.5, 19.3)
Eastern  31  7.8  (7.3, 9.7)  2.6  (2.4, 3.3)
Europe  23  4.3  (4.0, 5.7)  1.4  (1.3, 2.0)
Latin  31  19.1  (14.0, 28.9)  6.9  (5.2, 11.5)
America  23  12.5  (9.0, 21.0)  5.1  (4.0, 9.6)33
Table  4:  Aggregate  Poverty  Measures  in  1985  Based  on a World  Lorenz  Curve
Poverty  Poverty  Non-socialist  China  Aggregate
measure  line  countries  (s-.24)  poverty
($/ps/mn)  (Elliptical  model  of  (Non-socialist
Berry et al., 1989  +  China)
Lorenz  curve)
(s-.76)
H: Headcount  31  25.1  21.1  24.1
index  (X)  23  18.4  9.2  16.2
PG:  Poverty  31  10.8  5.9  9.6
gap index  (X)  23  6.9  2.9  5.9
Note:  n-no.countries,  s-population  share,  total  population-4,278  million.3 4
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Appendix  2:  Model  for  Predicting  PPP  Exchange  Rates
Right  hand side  Coefficient  Standard
variable  error
Intercept  -2.001  1.766
Official  exchange  rate (log)  .980  .014
Mean private  consumption  at  1.118  .379
official  exchange  rate  (log)
Squared  value  of above  -. 599  .273  (xlO)
Infant  Mortality  Rate  -. 559  .359  (xlOO,
Life  expectancy  -. 555  .160  (xlO)
Urbanization  (log)  .133  .078
CHINA  (-1,  0 otherwise)  1.481  .329
BURMA  (-1,  0 otherwise)  1.292  .310
R-Squared  - .986
F-statistic F(8,77)  - 662
S.E.E.-  .290
Mean of dependent  variable  - 2.218
St.dev.  dependent  variable  - 2.310
Ramsey  RESET  test  of functional  form  F(1,76)-.71
LM test  for  normality  CHI-SQ(2)-  1.44
LM test  for  heteroscedasticity  CHI-SQ(1)-.37
Estimated  PPP  rates  to $US:
China:  0.67 (23%  of official  rate)
Burma:  2.33 (27%  of official  rate)
Note:  The  dependent  variable  is  the  log  of the  constant  PPP  exchange  rate
for  1985  from  Summers  and  Heston  (19.8). For  China  and  Burma,  this  is set
at the  official  rate  when  estimating  the  regression.36
Appendix  3:  Summary  of  Distributional  Data
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
EstimOtion m_thod
Year  Y/E  NM/PC rank  By  F/L  PPP  zxS31  z%S23
I ndonesi  84  E  PC  PC/E  F  352.1r  K  K
MatLysia  84  Y  PC  PC/Y  F  1.26  a  a
PhiOippines  85  E  MN  NH/E  F  6.86  K  K
Thailand  86  E  MN  PC/E  F  ?.s  a  o
China  85  E  PC  PC/Y  F  0.67  a  0
Bangledesh  81/82  E  PC  PC/E  F  8.40  K  K
India  83  E  PC  PC/E  F  4.05  K  K
Pakistan  84/85  E  MM0  MM/E  F  5.90  K  K
Sri  Lanka  85/6  Y  PC  PC/Y  P  4.97  K  K
Brazil  8S  V  PC  PC/Y  F  2.53  0  a
CoLabia  88  Y  MH  PC/Y  L  51.27  K  K
Costs  Nica  82  Y  MN  PC/Y  L  '2.30  K  K
Guatemea  79-81  Y  MH  MM/Y  L  0.76  K  K
Jamica  U  E  PC  PC/E  L  2.37  K  K
Peru  85  E  PC  PC/E  F  3.62  K  K
v  enezueLa  87  Y  PC  PC/Y  F  5.14  K  K
Botswana  85/86  y  PC  PC/Y  L  0.64  E  E
Cote d'lvoire  85  E  PC  PC/E  F  250.06  K  K
Ghana  87  E  PC  PC/E  F  64.49  K  K
Morocco  84/5  E  NH  MM/E  F  3.51  L  L
Poland  85  Y  PC  PC/Y  F  81.87  L  L
YugosLavia  85  Y  PC  PC/Y  F  135.80  K  K
Motes:
(1)  Year of  the  survey.
(2)  *Y-  irndicates  inc,  "Em indicates  expenditure.
(3)  "HMM  indicates  houaehold distribution,  NPCm  indicates  per  capita  distribution
(4)  This  column indicates  how  observation  units  were ranked  In  each distribution.
e  g., mPC/Em  represents  ranking  by  per  capita  expenditure,  and  N/YV represents
ranking  by household incin.
(5)  F-  Indicates  data  are  in  the  fors  of  a  frequency distribution  of  households/person,
LW  indicates  date  are  In  the  foru  of  inc  shares.
(6)  PPP  exchange rates  from Siamrs  ad  Nestan (1968) except as noted  In  text.
(7),(8)  Method used for  estimting  poverty  masaures.
KO is  for  Kakwanl  Lorenu parmeterization.
O* is  for  Ouadrectic  interpolation.
WEE  is  for  Eliptfcal  Lorenz estimtion.
L  is  for  Linear  interpolation.37
Notes
1.  This is analogous to the concept of the "subjective  poverty line" based
on household surveys of income norms (for discussion and references see
Kapteyn et al., 1988).
2.  Standard errors are given in parentheses below each coefficient. NORM,
HETERO, and RESET are the Lagrange multiplier tests for normality,
heteroscedasticity, and functional form respectively, distributed as Chi-
square, with degrees of freedom in parentheses.
3.  See, for example, Kravis et al., (1978), Berry et al., (1983, 1989),
Grosh and Nafziger (1986),  Yotopoulos (1989).
4.  In general, we can write the FGT class of poverty measures for any
distribution of income or consumption 1y 1), i-l,..,n, as follows:
Pa  - E  [(z-yi)/z  l/n
yi<z
where a  is a non-negative parameter. H is then obtained when a  - 0, while PG
is obtained when a  - 1.
5.  Villasenor and Arnold (1989)  compare various Lorenz specifications,
including the Kakwani-Podder model, on Australian data and find the elliptical
model to be preferable.  However, their comparison does not include the
Kakwani specification used here.
6.  Though the Kakwani specification can go astray at very low values of p
due to the limiting properties of its slope.  This does not appear to be a
practical problem here.
7.  A valid Lorenz curve L(p) must be monotonic increasing and strictly
convex for p in the (0,1) interval.  When not implied for all such p, this was
tested in the neighborhood of the estimated headcount index.  A valid Lorenz
curve should also have the limiting properties that L(O)-O and L(1)-l.
However, we have not imposed or tested these conditions (and they do not hold
for the Kakwani model), on the grounds that we are mainly interested in
obtaining a good interior fit.
8.  The following decision rule was followed rigorously: If the Kakwani
specification failed (by  violating the theoretical conditions for a Lorenz
curve), then the elliptical model was used. If this failed then quadratic
interpolation  was used. If this failed (by  yielding negative densities in the
relevant region) then linear interpolation  was used.
9.  For two countries - Bangladesh and Pakistan - the predicted PPP from the
model in Appendix 1 was used in preference to the Summers and Heston figure,
which was somewhat lower and gave estimates of the mean consumptions for th.se
countries which were higher than we considered plausible.  The need for this38
adjustment was  confirmed in discussions with Bank economists who work on those
countries.
10.  This is the 1985 population weighted mean of the consumption per capita
estimates at constant PPP implied by Summers and Heston (1988, Table 3), after
correcting the typing errors for India and El Salvador.
11.  This is based on the elliptical model.  The Kakwani specification
violated the theoretical conditions for a Lorenz curve.
12.  Note that this is an "arc elasticity", which will generally differ from
the point elasticities at both poverty lines.  The point elasticity for the
headcount index requires estimation of the density function of incomes at the
poverty line.  That is only possible for the sub-set of countries for which we
have  distributional  data.
13.  The  correlation  coefficients  between  predicted  and  actual  Lorenz  curves
for  1986  over  the  11 available  points  on the  interior  of the (0,1)  interval
are .9998  based  on the  1960  Lorenz  curve  and .9999  based  on 1970. The
standard  deviations  of the  errors  in  prediction  are .0061  and .0078.
14.  This  uses  a result  due to  Blackburn  (1989).39
References
Berry, A., Bourguignon, F., and Morrisson, C. The Level of World Inequality:
How Much Can We Say?, The Review of Income and Wealth 29: 217-242, 1983.
. Changes in the World Distribution of Income between
1950 and 1977, The Economic Journal 93: 331-350, 1983.
_.  The World Distribution of Income: Evolution over the
Recent Period and Effects of Population Growth. Paper pr'.sented  at a
conference on "Consequences of Rapid Population Growth", United Nations,
New York, 1989.
Blackburn, M.L. Interpreting the Magnitude of Changes in Measures of Income
Inequality, Journal of Econometrics 42: 21-25, 1989.
Datt, G., and Ravallion, M. Regional Disparities, Targeting, and Poverty in
India, PRE Working Paper 375, World Bank, 1989.
Foster, J., Greer, J., and Thorbecke, E. A Class of Decomposable Poverty
Measures, Econometrica 52: 761-765, 1984.
Grosh, M. E., and E. W. Nafziger, The Computation of World Income
Distribution, Economic DeveloDment and Cultural Change 34: 347-360, 1986.
Kakwani, N.  Poverty and Economic Growth with Applications to Cote D'Ivoire.
Mimeo, Welfare and Human Resources Division,  World Bank, 1989.
Kakwani, N., and Podder, N. On the Estimation of Lorenz Curves from Grouped
Observations, International Economic Review 14: 137-148, 1973.
Kanbur, S.M.R. Measurement and Alleviation of Poverty, IMF Staff Papers 34:
60-85, 1987.
Kapteyn, A., Kooreman, P., and R. Willemse, Some Methodological Issues in the
Interpretation of Subjective Poverty Definitions, The Journal of Human
Resources 23: 222-242, 1988.40
Kravis, I. An approximation of the relative real per capita CDP of the
People's Republic of China,Journal of ComDarative Economics 5:60-78,1981.
Kravis, I., Heston, A., and R. Summers, Real GDP par capita for more than 100
Countries, Economic Journal 88: 215-242, 1978.
Ravallion, M. The Challenging Arithmetic of Poverty in Bangladesh, Background
Paper to the World Development ReRort, 1990.
Ravallion, M., and Huppi, M. Poverty and Undernutrition in Indonesia During
the 1980s, Policy, Planning and Research Working Paper 286, World Bank.
Sen, A. Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement, Econometrica 44: 219-
231, 1976.
Summers, R., and Heston, A. A New Set of International Comparisons of Real
Product and Price Levels Estimates for 130 Countries, 1950-1985, Review
of Income and Wealth, 34: 1-26, 1988.
Villasenor, J., and Arnold, B.C. Elliptical Lorenz Curves, Journal of
Econometrics 40: 327-338, 1989.
Yotopoulos, P. A. Distributions of Real Income:  Within Countries and by
World Income Cldsses, Review of Income and Wealth 35: 357-376, 1989.41
Figure 1







See  Flgure 2
100  . ----------  -.----------------
500.
50
0  100  200  300  400  500  600  700  800  900  1000
Mean consumption,  $/ps/mn,  1985 PPP
Figure 2







0  50  100  IS0  200  250  300
Mean consumption.  S/ps/mn,  1985 PPP42
Figure  3






20  +  +
10  -/  +
10
0  10  20  30  40  50  60





so  I 
60
20  _v 
10  2
0
SAsla  S-S.Afr.  Mild-E./N.A  E Asih  LsAm.  E.Eur.  TOTAL
0  95% confid.interval  x  Mean4  &  eF  b  4  .6  .v  .
o  o  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
0  ,- 
f  #t~~~~~~~~~
#;  y  :  a  W~~~~~~~~~PRE  Working  Paggr  Series
Contact
fl  AuAhor  for paper
WPS568  Higher  Wages  for Relief  Work  Can  Martin  Ravallion  January  1991  C. Spooner
Make  Many  of  the Poor  Worse  Off:  Gaurav  Datt  30464
Recent  Evidence  from Maharashtra's Shubham  Chaudhuri
'Employment Guarantee  Scheme'
WPS569  Domestic  Purchase  Requirements  for  Wendy  E. Takacs  January  1991  S. Fallon
Import  License  Allocations  in Mali  37947
WPS570  Debt  Concentration  and Soandary  Raquel  Fernandez  January  1991  S. King-Watson
Market  Prices  Sul Ozler  31047
WPS571  Credit's  Effect  on Productivity  in  Gershon  Feder  January  1991  C. Spooner
Chinese  Agriculture:  A  Lawrence  J. Lau  30464
Microeconomic  Model  of  Justin Y. Lin
Disequilibrium  Xiaopeng  Luo
WPS572  Capital Positions  of Japanese  Edward  J. Kane  January  1991  S. King-Watson
Banks  Haluk  Unal  33730
Asli Demirguc-Kunt
WPS573  Malaysian  Labor  Markets  Under  Dipak  Mazumdar  Januarv  1991  M. Schreier
Structural  Adjustment  36432
WPS574  Public  Policies  and Saving  in  Vittorio  Corbo  January  1991  S. Jonnakuty
Developing  Countries  Klaus  Schmid,  Hebbel  39074
WPS575  Household  Saving  in Developing  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel  January  1991  E. Khine
Countries: First  Cross-Country  Steven  B. Webb  39361
Evidence  Giancarlo  Corsetti
WPS576  Lessons  from  Tax Reform:  Wayne  Thirsk  Jan,uary  1991  A. Bhalla
An Overview  37699
WPS577  Africa's  Rising  Inflation: Causes,  Ajay  Chhibber  February  1991  B. Dhomun
Consequences,  and  Cures  39413
WPS578  The  Bank's  Use  of Technical  Beatrice  Buyck  January 1991  E. Madrona
Assistance  for Institutional  37496
Development
WPS579  Chile's  Experience  with Stabilization  Vittorio  Corbo  January  1991  E. Khine
Revisited  Andres  Solimano  39361
WPS580  Do Natural  Resource-Based  Alexander  J. Yeats  January  1991  J. Jacobson
Industrialization  Strategies  Convey  33710
Important  (Unrecognized)  Price
Benefits  for Commodity-Exporting
Developing  Countries?PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
WPS581  How  Successful  is  World Bank  Patrick  Conway  January  1991  S. Fallon
Lending  for Structural  Adjustment?  37947
WPS582  Adjustment  Programs  and Bank  Vittorio  Corbo  January  1991  L. Oropesa
Support: Rationale  and  Main  Stanley  Fischer  39075
Results
WPS583  World  Bank Lending  for Education  Marlaine  E.  Lockheed  January 1991  C. Cristobal
Research,  1982-89  Alastair  G. Rodd  33640
WPS584  Whither  Hungary  and  the European  Alfred  Tovias  January 1991  G. llogon
Communities?  Sam  Laird  33732
WPS585  Financial  Innovation  and Money  Patricio  Arrau  January  1991  S. King-Watson
Demand:  Theory  and  Empirical  Jose  de Gregorio  31047
Implementation
WPS586  The  Challenging  Arithmetic  of Poverty Martin  Ravallion  February  1991  WDR  Office
in Bangladesh  31393
WPS587  Quantifying  the Magnitude  and  Martin  Ravallion  February  1991  WDR  Office
Severity  of Absolute  Poverty  in the  Gaurav  Datt  31393
Developing  World  in the Mid-1980s  Dominique  van de Waite
Elaine  Chan